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Microeconomics II (advanced level)

2024/2025
Учебный год
ENG
Обучение ведется на английском языке
3
Кредиты
Статус:
Курс обязательный
Когда читается:
2-й курс, 1 модуль

Преподаватель

Course Syllabus

Abstract

The objective of the course is to provide the students with knowledge and understanding on how to model the behavior of agents in situations, where have reason to act strategically. In the first part of the course, the students will learn game theory, which is the systematic study of how rational agents behave in strategic situations, or in games, where each agent must first know the decision of the other agents before knowing which decision is best for himself. In the second part of the course, the students will be introduced to a situation in which different agents possess different information (i.e., asymmetric information) and see that the strategic opportunities arising in the presence of asymmetric information typically lead to inefficient market outcomes, a form of market failure. We will learn two forms of asymmetric information - adverse selection and moral hazard – and get familiar with the existing market solutions to the adverse selection and moral hazard problems.
Learning Objectives

Learning Objectives

  • • To learn a variety of methods for determining the outcome of a game, which gives rise to a particular solution concept such as dominant strategy equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, backward induction, subgame perfection, and sequential equilibrium.
  • • To get familiar with games in which the agents make a single, simultaneous choice (Strategic-form Games) and with games in which players may make choices in sequence (Extensive-form games).
Expected Learning Outcomes

Expected Learning Outcomes

  • to get familiar with games in which the agents make a single, simultaneous choice (Strategic-form Games) and with games in which players may make choices in sequence (Extensive-form games)
  • to learn a variety of methods for determining the outcome of a game, which gives rise to a particular solution concept such as dominant strategy equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, backward induction, subgame perfection, and sequential equilibrium
Course Contents

Course Contents

  • 1. Game Theory, Strategic-form games, Dominant Strategy
  • 2. Nash Equilibrium, Mixed Strategies, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
  • 3. Extensive-form games, Behavior Strategies
  • 4. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Assessment Elements

Assessment Elements

  • non-blocking Homework assignments
  • non-blocking In-class participation
  • non-blocking Final exam
  • non-blocking Test
Interim Assessment

Interim Assessment

  • 2024/2025 1st module
    0.5 * Final exam + 0.25 * Homework assignments + 0.05 * In-class participation + 0.2 * Test
Bibliography

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

  • Advanced Microeconomic Theory, 3rd ed., 656 p., Jehle, G. A., Reny, P. J., 2011

Recommended Additional Bibliography

  • Advanced microeconomic theory, Jehle Geoffrey, Reny Philip, 2000

Authors

  • BRODSKAYA NATALYA NIKOLAEVNA
  • KUCHUMOVA YULIYA ANDREEVNA