Environmental and Energy Politics

2018/2019

Учебный год

ENG

Обучение ведется на английском языке

4

Кредиты

Кто читает:

Департамент политологии и международных отношений

Статус:

Курс по выбору

Когда читается:

3-й курс, 4 модуль

Course Syllabus

Abstract

The course is devoted to the concept of “resource curse”, which is also known as “paradox of plenty”. The term “resource curse” was invented in the beginning of 1990 in order to describe strong correlation between an abundance of natural resources and poor economic growth. Since then hundreds of papers appeared to investigate the impact of natural resources on national economy, politics and society. The course will address the field both theoretically and practically. The first part of the course is devoted to theories and analytical models of resource curse. The second part deals with empirical papers which provide arguments both pro and contra the idea that resource abundance can prevent economic growth, democracy and development. And the third part of the course pays attention to worldwide examples of how resource abundance works in different institutional contexts. Both countries cursed by their natural resources (Nigeria, NRK, Venezuela etc.) and countries managed to escape the curse (Norway, Canada, Botswana etc.) will be observed in the classes.

Learning Objectives

• The main goal is to provide students with the knowledge of several theories of “resource curse” elaborated in economics and political science.

Expected Learning Outcomes

• Able to solve professional problems based on synthesis and analysis
• Able to outlines the need for resources and plan its using for solving professional problems
• Student is capable of executing applied analysis of the political phenomena and political processes by using political science methods and in support of practical decision making process.
• Student is capable of reporting the results of the information retrieval and analysis, academic or applied research she/he has conducted: in various genres (including reviews, policy papers, reports and publications pertaining to socio-political subject matter); and depending on the target audience.

Course Contents

• Presentation of the course. Introductory lecture. Overview of the course. Formal and informative requirements. Basic terms and concepts
• Types of natural resources and methods of their quantity and quality evaluation. The concept of resource in the economy. Indicators of resource abundance.
• Macroeconomic Consequences of Resource Redundancy. Abundance of Natural Resources and Economic Growth Promotion
• Natural Resources, Human Rights and Human Capital. Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts
• Natural Resources and the Quality of Institutions. Norway. Botswana. Australia.
• Nigeria, Angola, DRC. «Blood Diamonds» and Kimberley Process
• Russia. Natural Resources, Domestic and Foreign Policy
• Natural Resources and Federalism. Russia, Canada, USA

Assessment Elements

• Participation in seminars
• Midterm essay
• Final essay
• Presentation
• Exam

Interim Assessment

• Interim assessment (4 module)
  The formative assessment consists of: 1. Participation in seminars 20% 2. Midterm essay 25% 3. Final essay 30% 4. Presentation 25% The final exam is calculated using the formula: 1. Formative Assessment – 60% 2. Exam – 40 %

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

• Marganii︠a︡, O., & Gelʹman, V. (2010). Resource Curse and Post-Soviet Eurasia : Oil, Gas, and Modernization. Lanham, Md: Lexington Books. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsebk&AN=336431
• Ross, M. L. (2004). How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases. International Organization, (01), 35. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.cup.intorg.v58y2004i01p35.67.58

Recommended Additional Bibliography

• Gylfason, T. (2001). Natural resources, education, and economic development. European Economic Review, (4–6), 847. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.eee.eecrev.v45y2001i4.6p847.859
• Päivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch, & Elisabeth Gilmore. (2005). A Diamond Curse? Journal of Conflict Resolution, (4), 538. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.sae.jocore.v49y2005i4p538.562
• Paul Collier, & Anke Hoeffler. (2005). Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, (4), 625. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.sae.jocore.v49y2005i4p625.633
• Robinson, J. A., Torvik, R., & Verdier, T. (2006). Political foundations of the resource curse. Journal of Development Economics, (2), 447. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.eee.deveco.v79y2006i2p447.468