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Regular version of the site
Book
Terrorism and Political Contention. New Perspectives on North Africa and the Sahel Region

Atanasiu M., Besenyő J., Denisova T. S. et al.

Springer, 2024.

Article
American Neocolonialism on the Soviet Cinema Screen (Based on Films About Latin America)

Клещенко Л. Л.

Вестник Волгоградского государственного университета. Серия 4: История. Регионоведение. Международные отношения. 2024. Vol. 29. No. 1. P. 77-86.

Book chapter
’Not what we want’: Why do (not) citizens use e-government services? Evidence from St. Petersburg, Russia
In press

Arkatov D., Filatova O.

In bk.: 17th International Conference on Theory and Practice of Electronic Governance (ICEGOV 2024), October 01–04, 2024, Pretoria, South Africa.. NY: ACM, 2024.

Working paper
Consensus or Constitution? - A Conceptual Perspective on the Legitimacy of Constitutional Courts in Consociations

Gál A.

OxonCourts Judicial Studies Graduate Colloquium. OxonCourts Judicial Studies Graduate Colloquium. University of Oxford, 2019

The next seminar of the Department for Political Science and International Affairs will be held on Friday, April 14, 2023 at 18.30.

Title: Formal power in informal networks. Distribution of power resources in personalized bureaucracies: the case of the administrative elites of the Russian region.

Speaker: Kirill Mel'nikov, Research Fellow, Institute for Philosophy and Law, Ural Branch of Russian Academy of Sciences

Annotation. The instrumental use of patronage for political appointments and career advancement can be found in all types of political regimes and historical periods. Despite extensive academic interest in the political and economic effects of patron-client relationships, the nature of the interaction between informal networks and formal hierarchies remains poorly understood. One of the mysteries of such interaction is how formal powers are distributed within administrative apparatuses built on personal connections. The presented empirical study addresses this issue through the case study of the Russian region. Using the apparatus of network analysis and statistical modeling, the study shows that subnational leaders tend to monopolize those formal powers that provide administrative control over other governments. At the same time, other supervisory, financial and regulatory powers are relatively evenly distributed in the informal network. This pattern manifests itself regardless of the institutional context, the degree of subnational autonomy, or the form of the informal network itself, which signals the importance of the control functions carried out in personalized bureaucracies by the core of the informal network.

Zoom link: 

https://us02web.zoom.us/j/88609241534?pwd=UXhCUWc5U3JodGxQVGlvKzdDLzZyQT09