198068 Saint Petersburg
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The Department was created on the basis of the Department of Politics, which was established in 2005. The main purpose of the department is to provide today’s students with professional training in the fields of political analysis and sociopolitical engineering, as well as in creating a special creative atmosphere that allows for the formation and development of a society of political experts who are capable of not only carrying out professional research, but also proposing and implementing solutions to relevant Russian and international problems.
Edited by: L. Issaev, A. Korotayev, J. Besenyő.
Journal of Globalization Studies. 2024. Vol. 16. No. 2.
Sevastianov S., Koldunova E., Streltsov D.
In bk.: The Routledge Handbook of Russian International Relations Studies. Routledge, 2023. Ch. 11. P. 176-189.
OxonCourts Judicial Studies Graduate Colloquium. OxonCourts Judicial Studies Graduate Colloquium. University of Oxford, 2019
Title: Formal power in informal networks. Distribution of power resources in personalized bureaucracies: the case of the administrative elites of the Russian region.
Speaker: Kirill Mel'nikov, Research Fellow, Institute for Philosophy and Law, Ural Branch of Russian Academy of Sciences
Annotation. The instrumental use of patronage for political appointments and career advancement can be found in all types of political regimes and historical periods. Despite extensive academic interest in the political and economic effects of patron-client relationships, the nature of the interaction between informal networks and formal hierarchies remains poorly understood. One of the mysteries of such interaction is how formal powers are distributed within administrative apparatuses built on personal connections. The presented empirical study addresses this issue through the case study of the Russian region. Using the apparatus of network analysis and statistical modeling, the study shows that subnational leaders tend to monopolize those formal powers that provide administrative control over other governments. At the same time, other supervisory, financial and regulatory powers are relatively evenly distributed in the informal network. This pattern manifests itself regardless of the institutional context, the degree of subnational autonomy, or the form of the informal network itself, which signals the importance of the control functions carried out in personalized bureaucracies by the core of the informal network.