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This study analyzes roll call voting in the Council of Ministers from December 2003 to May 2019 in order to identify the factors that determine the strategies of coalition behavior of 28 EU Member States. The analysis makes possible to single out two important cleavages affecting the coalitional preferences of the Ministers of states. The first cleavage is observed between the EU members from Eastern and Western Europe. The second cleavage is associated with the duration of the countries’ EU membership. The rationalistic intentions of member countries related to the agenda of the Council and their ideological preferences also influence the process of coalition formation and allow the EU states to go beyond the geographic and ‘temporal’ cleavages.
This article addresses the puzzle of electoral engineering in autocracies using data from three rounds of Russian regional legislative elections between 2003 and 2017. The analysis shows that electoral engineering was widespread in regions where governors lacked the resources necessary to rely on blatant forms of electoral malpractice for the benefit of United Russia. This pattern became evident during the third round of regional legislative elections. The study indicates that the manipulation of electoral systems may be important for authoritarian rulers when they are unable to rely on blatant electoral malpractice to ensure the certainty of electoral outcomes.
Field experiments have provided ample evidence of ethnic and racial discrimination in the labour market. Less is known about how discrimination varies in multi-ethnic societies, where the ethnic composition of populations is different across locations. Inter-group contact and institutional arrangements for ethnic minorities can mitigate the sense of group threat and reduce discrimination. To provide empirical evidence of this, we conduct a field experiment of ethnic discrimination in Russia with a sample of over 9,000 job applications. We compare ethnically homogeneous cities and cities with ethnically mixed populations and privileged institutional status of ethnic minorities. We find strong discrimination against visible minorities in the former but much weaker discrimination in the latter. These findings demonstrate how institutions and historical contexts of inter-group relations can affect ethnic prejudice and discrimination.
The paper aims at contributing to the debate on whether open govern-ment impacts the quality of governance, and if so, identify the causal mechanisms that might be evident to support this impact. Using structural equation modeling, we test the sample of country-level data from 2014 to 2017, assessing the direct effect of open government on the government effectiveness, as well as its indirect effect via the levels of democracy and corruption. Our analysis confirms that open government may have positive effects on the quality of governance, but this effect is moderated by the level of corruption in a country.
The transformation of the peaceful demonstrations, which started on November 21, 2013, against Yanukovych’s decision to suspend the signing of the association agreement with the EU, into the bloodshed in Kyiv and eastern Ukraine, has vividly demonstrated that the rhetoric of the “protection of Russian-speakers’ rights” can be easily transformed from the level of “discursive threats” to the real threat of Ukraine’s dissolution. Therefore, the article seeks to explain how language-related issues were securitized in public discussions in leading Ukrainian blogs and on news websites that function in the Russian language after the Revolution of Dignity. The analysis of journalistic articles and users’ comments encompasses the period of 2013–2015 when the Russian–Ukrainian conflict and the discussion of language issues reached its climax. It is argued that despite an extreme presence of anti-Russian (anti-imperialist) arguments and consolidation over the idea of Ukrainian as the only state language (“one nation–one language”), arguments that supported an equal legal status of Russian- and Ukrainian-speakers were also to be found in selected digital media outlets. The analysis has also demonstrated that for most online users of Ukrainian digital media that function in Russian, the state language is constructed as the language discriminated against in its own national state.
This article seeks to reveal the role of compliance in the functioning of the European Union as a system of multi-level governance and to observe the factors determining the differentiation of EU member states by the level of compliance with the European Union law. In order to determine the degree of compliance of a state with the EU law, it is necessary to concentrate on three main stages of compliance: (1) transposition of the norm, (2) implementation of the norm and (3) application of the norm. We conclude that, within the framework of the compliance process, member states and institutions of the European Union, primarily the European Commission, participate in a “two-level game”, in which they evaluate the gains and costs of choosing one or another strategy associated with three stages of compliance. EU countries choose between three compliance strategies: (1) unconditional compliance, (2) negotiation of better compliance conditions, and (3) ignoring the normative requirements for the longest possible period of time. In turn, supranational regulators, in their attempts to combat violations of the EU law, choose between the “soft” instruments of enforcement to compliance and the “hard” instrument of infringement. The choice of compliance strategies at the lower (national) level of power is determined by the following factors: (1) the level of economic development of the state, (2) the influence and role of the state within the framework of EU institutions, (3) the strength of the administrative apparatus of the state, (4) the coalition potential of the state and (5) legal fit. Thus, some states violate the EU law intentionally (voluntary non-compliance), while the difficulties of the compliance process for other countries are determined by objective reasons of a socio-economic nature (involuntary non-compliance). In turn, the supranational level of the “two-level game” when choosing a compliance strategy is guided by both administrative and reputational motives.
What is the catalyst of democratic rollbacks in the countries of the third wave of democratization [Huntington 1993; Shin 1994; Jaggers & Gurr 1995]? Why do democratic institutions weaken? Which areas of the state’s political life are primarily affected by de-democratization? In this paper, we seek to answer these questions by analyzing a small part of the empirical reality associated with the problem of de-democratization. Hungary and Poland are at the center of this study. These are the countries that were on the crest of the third wave of democratization in the 1990s and early 2000s, but after the right-populist parties came to power (Fidesz in Hungary and Prawo i Sprawiedliwość in Poland) began to introduce practices that could undermine the work of their democratic institutions. We suggest that Russia is the main exporter of anti-democratic practices to these countries.
The domino theory and the theory of linkage and leverage are used to construct the theoretical framework of the study. The explanatory power of these theories is tested when analyzing the de-democratization practices in the considered countries. For the encoding of dependent and independent variables, we refer to the MaxRange Historical World Regime Data database. The main method of data analysis is linear regression analysis.
The results of the analysis demonstrate that the main anti-democratic practices that were imported by Hungary and Poland from Russia are the fight against rallies and demonstrations, as well as the fight against unwanted media and NGOs. Russia seems to be the direct supplier of de-democratization for Hungary. At the same time, Budapest plays a role of transit point of de-democratization for Poland.
The article attempts to test empirically Samuel Huntington's well-known thesis about the relationship between democracy and political science based on data obtained during a survey "Professionalization and Social Impact of European Political Science" (ProSEPS) conducted among political scientists from 39 countries. The authors find significant relationships between the level of democracy and some parameters of political science; primarily, with the presence of political science in the public field. In the final section of the article hypotheses are put forward about other possible explanations of cross-country differences in the development of political science.
Aspirations to a just world order take a central place in Russian foreign strategy and reflect the vision of the better world system and better place for Russia in it shared by Russian political elite.
This article contributes to the growing body of research on the increasing role of judicial systems in regulating politics and religion (‘judicialization of politics and religion’) across the globe. By examining how academic expertise is deployed in anti-extremist litigation involving Russia’s minority religions, this article reveals important processes involved in this judicial regulation, in particular when legal and academic institutions lack autonomy and consistency of operation. It focuses on the selection of experts and the validation of their opinion within Russia’s academia and the judiciary, and identifies patterns in the experts’ approach to evidence and how they validate their conclusions in the eyes of the judiciary. Academic expertise provides an aura of legitimacy to judicial decisions in which anti-extremist legislation is used as a means to control unpopular minority religions and to regulate Russia’s religious diversity. As one of the few systematic explorations of this subject and the first focused on Russia, this article reveals important processes that produce religious discrimination and the role that anti-extremist legislation plays in these processes.
Modernizing reforms in Russia carried out under the banner of “Westernization” and “Europeanization”—and this has been their character throughout history—tend to treat modernization as a technical process, ignoring institutional transformations, not to mention the democratic values embedded in the modernization project. The implementation of educational reform in Russia thus raises a question: How does the incorporation of Russia into the system of international higher education affect academic rights and academic freedom? Can integration into that system by itself guarantee academic freedom within the Russian academy? To answer this question, one must first understand the role academic freedom played in Soviet scholarship and education.
This chapter examines an emerging regional security system in the Arctic. There was a significant shift in the Arctic powers’ threat perceptions and security policies in the High North. In contrast with the Cold War era when the Arctic was a zone for the global confrontation between the USSR and the U.S./NATO, now this region is seen by international players as a platform for international cooperation.The Arctic countries now believe that there are no serious hard security threats to them and that the soft security agenda is much more important. The military power now has new functions, such as ascertaining coastal states’ sovereignty over their exclusive economic zones and continental shelves in the region; protecting the Arctic countries’ economic interests in the North, and performing some symbolic functions. The Arctic states believe that the regional cooperative agenda could include climate change mitigation, environmental protection, maritime safety, Arctic research, indigenous peoples, cross- and trans-border cooperative projects, culture, etc.
The use of populist ideology can be an important element of the survival strategy for authoritarian leaders being an important tool for regime stabilization. The incentives for using populist ideology are shaping in response to a current combination of a threat to incumbent’s rule. As the examples of Putin and Nazarbayev, ruling in neighbouring authoritarian Russia and Kazakhstan, demonstrate, the intensity and scope with which the leader resorts to the use of populism, as well as concrete content of this ideology, can fundamentally differ.
This volume constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Digital Transformation and Global Society, DTGS 2019, held in St. Petersburg, Russia, in June 2019.
The 56 revised full papers and 9 short papers presented in the volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 194 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on e-polity: governance; e-polity: politics online; e-city: smart cities and urban planning; e-economy: online consumers and solutions; e-society: computational social science; e-society: humanities and education; international workshop on internet psychology; international workshop on computational linguistics.
An extensive body of literature shows that firms and businesspeople benefit from having political connections (Faccio 2010; Szakonyi 2018): being connected allows them to secure procurement contracts and government loans in hard times and crises (Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven 2008; Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell 2006; Khwaja and Mian 2005; Li et al. 2008), gives them tax benefits (Wu et al. 2012), and increases the firms’ market valuation (Faccio 2006; Liu, Tang, and Tian 2013; Su and Fung 2013). Connectedness is found to be especially important where institutions are weak (Li, Meng, and Zhang 2006; Gehlbach, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya 2010), but proves beneficial even in the well institutionalized environments (Goldman, Rocholl, and So 2009; Acemoglu et al. 2016) that are generally expected to discourage informality. Research into effects of political connectedness, however extensive, does not always focus systematically on the top-level business political engagement, and almost never compares different kinds of political connection and their efficiency (e.g. connections at the parliamentary v. executive, national v. regional level). Most studies are also essentially cross-sectional in their design – meaning they do not explore the possibility of change in the way connections work over time in any given jurisdiction, only showing how connected firms and businesspeople differ from the matchable unconnected ones. As a result the significance of the very political context making these connections meaningful for the businesspeople remains unexplored. We seek to fill these gaps by assembling and quantitatively analyzing a unique comprehensive data set of Russia’s richest businesspeople’s political connections for years 2003-2010.
This paper investigates to what extent activity of a social movement on a social networking site is related to participation in offline collective action. Through this research, we seek to contribute to a broader theory of effective communicative structures of social movements. We use the data of roughly 12,000 individuals from 17 online groups representing the branches of the ‘Observers for Fair Elections’ movement in 17 districts of St. Petersburg, Russia, and compare their online properties to real offline participation of movement members in elections in the role of electoral observers. We find that while prediction of individual offline participation with this online data is of limited power, association between district participation rates and online group features is very strong. Large, more inclusive and evenly connected networks, where people are engaged in high-threshold online activities, produce more offline participants; weak individual-level prediction, combined with strong group-level prediction, suggests either the presence of the ‘network effect’ or of third factors – such as prior contentious experience or the effect of leaders.
Explanation of inversions in Russian history causes major conceptual problems. The traditionally used conceptual apparatus and its theoretical schemes does not seem to really “grasp” this reality, at best, it only describes the Russian reality to some extent. It simply fails to capture the nature and mechanisms that lie in the specifics of Russian society and its dynamics. Hence, there are widespread conclusions about “pathology,” historical “rut,” constant matrix, and endless reproduction of the “predetermined” characteristics of social life in Russia. However, expanding the conceptual apparatus with a constructive approach, combined with a specific historical approach, makes it possible to single out more than one agent of modernization processes (political elite, merged with state authorities), but at least two – authority and society taken discreetly. From this point of view, the inverse nature of Russian modernization has two causes. One of these is social, associated with the peculiarities of Russian society, where underdeveloped social forces are dominated by the imperious will. The second cause is related to modernization attempts based on external historical experience. However, due to the former cause, these attempts turn out to be premature and ill-conceived, giving rise to new conflicts and deformations in society. Both causes are complementary and intertwined. At the same
time, there are general civilizational processes, such as urbanization and formation of a mass society, modernization processes in Russian society, including the formation of national identity. This creates prerequisites for a qualitative change in the development of society. If the main factors of inversion “from top down” are hasty and imitative, then doing things “from bottom up” presupposes slow development of the middle class, which, nevertheless, creates conditions for real mediation.
The Handbook of Research on International Collaboration, Economic Development, and Sustainability in the Arctic discusses the perspectives and major challenges of the investment collaboration and development and commercial use of trade routes in the Arctic. Featuring research on topics such as agricultural production, environmental resources, and investment collaboration, this book is ideally designed for policymakers, business leaders, and environmental researchers seeking coverage on new practices and solutions in the sphere of achieving sustainability in economic exploration of the Artic region
The chapter examines the Arctic region, which suffers from a lot of potential conflicts because of its abundant natural resources that are the subject of competition between the Arctic and non-Arctic powers. The authors argue that after the Cold War various regimes regulating the Arctic spread to the vast and complex network to form a new regional legal order, unlike the period when military force was the main instrument of coercion in global politico-ideological confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United states. According to the authors, the only effective way to the prevention of a potentially new type of global conflict in the Arctic is the enhancement of international legal instruments in the following areas: “delimitation of maritime spaces and definition of the limits of the continental shelf in the Arctic, the legal status of the Arctic maritime routes, improvement and proper implementation of various regulations varying from the maritime safety rules (the Polar Code) to the international environmental law in the Far North
Using an original dataset on the richest Russian businesspeople for the period 2003--2010, we explore how political connections and wealth interact in the institutional environment of a fledgling autocracy. In our analysis, we answer several questions that allow us to shed some light on this matter. How political connections help businesspeople to accumulate wealth in a consolidating autocratic regime? Do businesspeople withdraw from politics as quality of political institutions deteriorates? To what extent such withdrawal follows strategic choices rather than government pressure? We show that, first, the decay of political institutions and monopolization of political power by the federal executive results in decrease in returns on businesspersons’ investment in political connectedness; and that, second, as this happens, businesspeople actually retreat from politics since political engagement no longer pays off for them thus revealing their assessment of the quality of Russian political institutions.
With the advent of online subject pools, conducting experiments outside the laboratory has become more popular among the scientific community. Unlike the lab, online and field environments tend to be accompanied by a loss of control. In this article we introduce otree_tools, a concise yet powerful add-on for oTree (Chen et al., 2016). otree_tools provides novel ways by which to measure behaviors that are potentially important in the social sciences, such as attention, multitasking and effort. The software also features a novel method of tracking time through the identification of noise. We demonstrate the utility of otree_tools with the help of experimental evidence. The software substantially increases control of the environment. Moreover, the original metrics can be employed for innovative outcome variables, opening the avenue for new research opportunities.