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This study analyzes roll call voting in the Council of Ministers from December 2003 to May 2019 in order to identify the factors that determine the strategies of coalition behavior of 28 EU Member States. The analysis makes possible to single out two important cleavages affecting the coalitional preferences of the Ministers of states. The first cleavage is observed between the EU members from Eastern and Western Europe. The second cleavage is associated with the duration of the countries’ EU membership. The rationalistic intentions of member countries related to the agenda of the Council and their ideological preferences also influence the process of coalition formation and allow the EU states to go beyond the geographic and ‘temporal’ cleavages.
This article addresses the puzzle of electoral engineering in autocracies using data from three rounds of Russian regional legislative elections between 2003 and 2017. The analysis shows that electoral engineering was widespread in regions where governors lacked the resources necessary to rely on blatant forms of electoral malpractice for the benefit of United Russia. This pattern became evident during the third round of regional legislative elections. The study indicates that the manipulation of electoral systems may be important for authoritarian rulers when they are unable to rely on blatant electoral malpractice to ensure the certainty of electoral outcomes.
Field experiments have provided ample evidence of ethnic and racial discrimination in the labour market. Less is known about how discrimination varies in multi-ethnic societies, where the ethnic composition of populations is different across locations. Inter-group contact and institutional arrangements for ethnic minorities can mitigate the sense of group threat and reduce discrimination. To provide empirical evidence of this, we conduct a field experiment of ethnic discrimination in Russia with a sample of over 9,000 job applications. We compare ethnically homogeneous cities and cities with ethnically mixed populations and privileged institutional status of ethnic minorities. We find strong discrimination against visible minorities in the former but much weaker discrimination in the latter. These findings demonstrate how institutions and historical contexts of inter-group relations can affect ethnic prejudice and discrimination.
In recent decades the term “civilization” has reached beyond academic and intellectual discourses as a category of identity construction and policy description. In the Russian case, the civilizational talk demonstrates a specific dialectic of domestic and foreign policy aspects. Since the 1990s, the concept of “civilization” has been used increasingly for descriptions of post-Soviet Russian identity in academic and public discourses. It has also penetrated into political rhetoric. In particular, it played an important role in re-interpretation of the Soviet historical narrative by the post-Soviet Communists. In the 2000s an evident rehabilitation of the imperial legacy in the Russian public discourse facilitated its further proliferation. The author of the chapter agrues that the attractiveness of the concept of “civilization” in the Russian case grounds on the symbolic resources that took shape over time. Two aspects of the historical tradition are particularly important here. The first is Russia’s imperial legacy. It involves a competition of different nationalisms which impedes a consolidation of the multiethnic nation. At the same time it provides cultural and symbolic resources that tempt to use a sub-national / civilizational template. The second is long tradition of constructing the Russian identity through correlation with Europe/the “West” that produced a rich repertoire of ideas, symbols and narratives facilitating its representation in civilizational terms. The chapter explores the general historical patterns of discursive construction of the Russian/Soviet identity focusing on the ideas of nation and civilization as competing templates of imagination. It demonstrates that the disposition of contemporary ruling elite to use both national and civilizational terms for description of post-Soviet Russian identity is a result of a long tradition of its construction by mixed templates, without fully fitting to neither one.
Based on the distinction between three approaches to loneliness, and the
development of the phenomenological and existential framework of loneliness
studies, this article explores Russia’s discourse of national loneliness on three
levels: a) the level of the official discourse of the Russian government; b) the level
of political and philosophical concepts; and c) the level of popular media and cinema
(with a specific focus on a case-study of the post-Soviet Russian blockbuster film
Brother and its sequel, Brother 2 ). In this article I concentrate on the particular
experiences of loneliness and their interpretations in Russia after the fall of
the USSR. The case of the fall of the USSR has shown that social and political
exploitations of different forms of national loneliness can become the flip side of
the doctrine of autonomy, equal individual rights and freedom from authoritarian
rule. This should be considered and never disregarded within our analysis of the
contours and new transformations of emerging hegemonic discourses, including the
different forms of nationalism in Russia, and in a wider cross-cultural perspective.
The paper aims at contributing to the debate on whether open govern-ment impacts the quality of governance, and if so, identify the causal mechanisms that might be evident to support this impact. Using structural equation modeling, we test the sample of country-level data from 2014 to 2017, assessing the direct effect of open government on the government effectiveness, as well as its indirect effect via the levels of democracy and corruption. Our analysis confirms that open government may have positive effects on the quality of governance, but this effect is moderated by the level of corruption in a country.
In the period after the global financial crisis of 2008, a new economic model have emerged - “platform capitalism”. Platform companies attracted huge ammount of money, allowing for a while to solve the problem of investment and supporting the financial market. The basis of this economic model is network effects produced by the integrated digital infrastructure, which contribute to monopolization and the constant expansion of platform companies in new areas. The principle of functioning of this infrastructure is the constant collection and further monetization of data extracted from the interactions of individuals with each other or with one of the elements of a digital economy or governance structures. This paper is devoted to the analysis of the logic of the emergence of “platform capitalism” as an effect of structural contradictions of neoliberalism (financialization, permanent market instability). The paper focuses on the transformation of the advertising market under the influence of platform companies, using the US example, to show the mechanism of digital disruption in print media business model. The development of digital infrastructure has allowed platform companies to collect and monetize data, deliver personalized ads to users throughout the internet. A structural shift has occurred - traditional media have ceased to be the main channels for transmitting advertising messages to certain social groups, advertising platforms are able to find them and deliver them ads on their own. In the framework of “platform capitalism”, many print media in order to survive try to transform themselves in accordance with the logic of the economic platform model (developing their website, data collection and monetization, integration into the logic of social networks).
The transformation of the peaceful demonstrations, which started on November 21, 2013, against Yanukovych’s decision to suspend the signing of the association agreement with the EU, into the bloodshed in Kyiv and eastern Ukraine, has vividly demonstrated that the rhetoric of the “protection of Russian-speakers’ rights” can be easily transformed from the level of “discursive threats” to the real threat of Ukraine’s dissolution. Therefore, the article seeks to explain how language-related issues were securitized in public discussions in leading Ukrainian blogs and on news websites that function in the Russian language after the Revolution of Dignity. The analysis of journalistic articles and users’ comments encompasses the period of 2013–2015 when the Russian–Ukrainian conflict and the discussion of language issues reached its climax. It is argued that despite an extreme presence of anti-Russian (anti-imperialist) arguments and consolidation over the idea of Ukrainian as the only state language (“one nation–one language”), arguments that supported an equal legal status of Russian- and Ukrainian-speakers were also to be found in selected digital media outlets. The analysis has also demonstrated that for most online users of Ukrainian digital media that function in Russian, the state language is constructed as the language discriminated against in its own national state.
This article seeks to reveal the role of compliance in the functioning of the European Union as a system of multi-level governance and to observe the factors determining the differentiation of EU member states by the level of compliance with the European Union law. In order to determine the degree of compliance of a state with the EU law, it is necessary to concentrate on three main stages of compliance: (1) transposition of the norm, (2) implementation of the norm and (3) application of the norm. We conclude that, within the framework of the compliance process, member states and institutions of the European Union, primarily the European Commission, participate in a “two-level game”, in which they evaluate the gains and costs of choosing one or another strategy associated with three stages of compliance. EU countries choose between three compliance strategies: (1) unconditional compliance, (2) negotiation of better compliance conditions, and (3) ignoring the normative requirements for the longest possible period of time. In turn, supranational regulators, in their attempts to combat violations of the EU law, choose between the “soft” instruments of enforcement to compliance and the “hard” instrument of infringement. The choice of compliance strategies at the lower (national) level of power is determined by the following factors: (1) the level of economic development of the state, (2) the influence and role of the state within the framework of EU institutions, (3) the strength of the administrative apparatus of the state, (4) the coalition potential of the state and (5) legal fit. Thus, some states violate the EU law intentionally (voluntary non-compliance), while the difficulties of the compliance process for other countries are determined by objective reasons of a socio-economic nature (involuntary non-compliance). In turn, the supranational level of the “two-level game” when choosing a compliance strategy is guided by both administrative and reputational motives.
What is the catalyst of democratic rollbacks in the countries of the third wave of democratization [Huntington 1993; Shin 1994; Jaggers & Gurr 1995]? Why do democratic institutions weaken? Which areas of the state’s political life are primarily affected by de-democratization? In this paper, we seek to answer these questions by analyzing a small part of the empirical reality associated with the problem of de-democratization. Hungary and Poland are at the center of this study. These are the countries that were on the crest of the third wave of democratization in the 1990s and early 2000s, but after the right-populist parties came to power (Fidesz in Hungary and Prawo i Sprawiedliwość in Poland) began to introduce practices that could undermine the work of their democratic institutions. We suggest that Russia is the main exporter of anti-democratic practices to these countries.
The domino theory and the theory of linkage and leverage are used to construct the theoretical framework of the study. The explanatory power of these theories is tested when analyzing the de-democratization practices in the considered countries. For the encoding of dependent and independent variables, we refer to the MaxRange Historical World Regime Data database. The main method of data analysis is linear regression analysis.
The results of the analysis demonstrate that the main anti-democratic practices that were imported by Hungary and Poland from Russia are the fight against rallies and demonstrations, as well as the fight against unwanted media and NGOs. Russia seems to be the direct supplier of de-democratization for Hungary. At the same time, Budapest plays a role of transit point of de-democratization for Poland.
The article attempts to test empirically Samuel Huntington's well-known thesis about the relationship between democracy and political science based on data obtained during a survey "Professionalization and Social Impact of European Political Science" (ProSEPS) conducted among political scientists from 39 countries. The authors find significant relationships between the level of democracy and some parameters of political science; primarily, with the presence of political science in the public field. In the final section of the article hypotheses are put forward about other possible explanations of cross-country differences in the development of political science.
This review systemizes contemporary, mostly foreign, academic literature, devoted to the development of
public policy in hybrid and authoritarian regimes, as well as to the interaction of citizens, civic associations
and authorities within the process of public policy-making. The academic interest in this topic is growing,
mostly due to the development of participatory practices in non-democracies, especially in China, which is
now becoming a popular object of analysis. The researchers emphasize the constant transformation of the
Chinese public policy and a variety of participation channels, open for citizens, non-profit organizations and
expert communities. It gives an opportunity to adapt existing Western theories to the analysis of hybrid regimes,
as well as to develop a new conceptual apparatus. Despite the significant growth of theoretical and
empirical knowledge on that topic, the research agenda still has some avenues for development. Firstly, an
important issue is the analysis of institutional effects of citizen participation, the interrelation of its information,
legitimation and imitation functions in a non-democratic context. Secondly, it is also relevant to study
the success factors of such initiatives, and their potential both as a source of regime stability and public policy
democratization. In the review we attempt to formulate these problems and possible empirical ways to
deal with them. In particular, a promising step could be the application of models and hypotheses, derived
from the Chinese case, to other countries, as well as to cross-national comparative studies.
In this review article we examine political science’s contribution to post-Soviet symbolic politics through a focus on memory politics, which took center stage in the political competition among post-Communist elites. Under the Soviet regime, Communist ideology and its symbolism permeated both public and private life. After this system collapsed, confronting the ancient regime’s symbolic presence became a visible and often dramatic aspect of post-Soviet transformation in the newly independent states. This led to the proliferation of research on symbolic politics in post-Communist countries.
The authors argue that political scientists, newly inspired by post-Soviet memory politics, have made two major contributions to the field of memory studies. First, political scientists brought the issue of power to the fore - who had the power to manipulate symbols in public space, and to what political ends? This research encourages a focus on the interactions among various mnemonic actors, rather than solely on the state. Second, political scientists brought innovative comparative theories and methods to a field previously dominated by studies of single monuments, cities, and countries. At the same time, the interdisciplinary nature of memory studies has encouraged political scientists to conceptualize power in more nuanced ways and helped to spread and legitimize the use of interpretive and ethnographic methods in political science.
Aspirations to a just world order take a central place in Russian foreign strategy and reflect the vision of the better world system and better place for Russia in it shared by Russian political elite.
Today, the concept of «sovereignty» is one of the most actively used,
both in political theory and in practical politics. Sovereignty as a theoretical concept
can be understood in different ways: as a given principle of international relations
(K. Waltz), as an international institution (R. Keohan), a social construct (A. Wendt), or
a special practice of power (M. Foucault). At the same time, it is not entirely clear to
researchers exactly how the concept of «sovereignty» reflects the empirical reality surrounding
This article is based on the distinction between «sovereignty» as a recognized
principle of international theory (Russian – suverenitet) and «sovereignty» as an element
of a symbolic structure that represents itself in the framework of performative
discourse. This discourse, although a subject to historical transformation, is rooted in
the nature of modern myth. The latter is reinforced with the symbolic nature of modern
man. In the context of this study, «sovereignty» can be understood as a set of performative
and discursive practices that define a symbolic order within community and it’s
interactions with symbolic forms of «sovereignty» beyond the community.
The article is devoted to a discussion of the methodological problems of studying
sovereignty as a symbolic structure. Based on the analysis of the current state of research
in particular, the works of R.B. Walker, I. Bartelson, C. Weber, T. Alberts,
M. Freeden, R.N. Lebow, G. Wydra and several other authors, sovereignty is seen as a
form of performative discursive practice that appeals to the construction and maintenance
of collective identity.
The article analyzes how the events of the 1990s – the collapse of the USSR and the period of economic and political reforms – are represented in the contemporary discourses of political forces that opposed to Boris Yeltsin and the Democrats/the Liberals – the Communists, the National-Populists and the National-Patriots. The research aims 1) to reveal how these events are integrated to the historical narratives that construct identities of these political forces and substantiate their claims for electoral support, 2) to identify the ways of using the memory about recent past as a political argument. The materials for research was provided by publications of the leaders of KPRF, LDPR and public intellectuals who have a reputation of national-patriots in the central media outlets. The method of research was qualitative content analysis.
The research has revealed that all considered discourses share a negative assessment of the 1990s but use different ways of including this period to their historical narratives. For the Communists, the 1990s is a story about tragic consequences of the lost “golden age” – the Soviet period. For the National-Populists, it provides a background for constructing their identity as the only defenders of the Russian people, whose interests were neglected by the Soviet, as well as by post-Soviet elites. For the National-Patriots, it is a challenge that needs to be responded. The image of “the hard 1990s” plays an important role in shaping watersheds in Russian politics, as it facilitates constructing common enemies – “the Liberals”, “the oligarchs”, and “the West” – for political groups with rather different programs.
The research has also revealed interesting differences in the ways the memory about recent past is used as a political argument. In spite of the fact that the Communists, the National-Populists and the National-Patriots share negative interpretations of the 1990s, the do not support the idea of strict contrast between “the hard 1990s” and “the stable 2000s” that is typical for Vladimir Putin’s rhetoric.
This article contributes to the growing body of research on the increasing role of judicial systems in regulating politics and religion (‘judicialization of politics and religion’) across the globe. By examining how academic expertise is deployed in anti-extremist litigation involving Russia’s minority religions, this article reveals important processes involved in this judicial regulation, in particular when legal and academic institutions lack autonomy and consistency of operation. It focuses on the selection of experts and the validation of their opinion within Russia’s academia and the judiciary, and identifies patterns in the experts’ approach to evidence and how they validate their conclusions in the eyes of the judiciary. Academic expertise provides an aura of legitimacy to judicial decisions in which anti-extremist legislation is used as a means to control unpopular minority religions and to regulate Russia’s religious diversity. As one of the few systematic explorations of this subject and the first focused on Russia, this article reveals important processes that produce religious discrimination and the role that anti-extremist legislation plays in these processes.
Modernizing reforms in Russia carried out under the banner of “Westernization” and “Europeanization”—and this has been their character throughout history—tend to treat modernization as a technical process, ignoring institutional transformations, not to mention the democratic values embedded in the modernization project. The implementation of educational reform in Russia thus raises a question: How does the incorporation of Russia into the system of international higher education affect academic rights and academic freedom? Can integration into that system by itself guarantee academic freedom within the Russian academy? To answer this question, one must first understand the role academic freedom played in Soviet scholarship and education.
This chapter examines an emerging regional security system in the Arctic. There was a significant shift in the Arctic powers’ threat perceptions and security policies in the High North. In contrast with the Cold War era when the Arctic was a zone for the global confrontation between the USSR and the U.S./NATO, now this region is seen by international players as a platform for international cooperation.The Arctic countries now believe that there are no serious hard security threats to them and that the soft security agenda is much more important. The military power now has new functions, such as ascertaining coastal states’ sovereignty over their exclusive economic zones and continental shelves in the region; protecting the Arctic countries’ economic interests in the North, and performing some symbolic functions. The Arctic states believe that the regional cooperative agenda could include climate change mitigation, environmental protection, maritime safety, Arctic research, indigenous peoples, cross- and trans-border cooperative projects, culture, etc.
The use of populist ideology can be an important element of the survival strategy for authoritarian leaders being an important tool for regime stabilization. The incentives for using populist ideology are shaping in response to a current combination of a threat to incumbent’s rule. As the examples of Putin and Nazarbayev, ruling in neighbouring authoritarian Russia and Kazakhstan, demonstrate, the intensity and scope with which the leader resorts to the use of populism, as well as concrete content of this ideology, can fundamentally differ.