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Regular version of the site
Article
What Changes for the Constitutional Court with the New Russian Constitution?

Grigoriev I.

Russian Politics. 2021. Vol. 6. No. 1. P. 27-49.

Book chapter
Surveillance City. Digital Transformation of Urban Governance in Autocratic Regimes

Balayan A. A., Tomin L. V.

In bk.: 2021 IEEE Communication Strategies in Digital Society Seminar (ComSDS). St. Petersburg: IEEE, 2021. P. 196-200.

Working paper
Consensus or Constitution? - A Conceptual Perspective on the Legitimacy of Constitutional Courts in Consociations

Gál A.

OxonCourts Judicial Studies Graduate Colloquium. OxonCourts Judicial Studies Graduate Colloquium. University of Oxford, 2019

The HSE Department of Political Science invites you to the Research Seminar, Friday, November 27, 2020, at 4.00 pm (MSK)

Speaker: Masatomo Torikai (Ph.D. Student, Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, University of Tokyo, Japan)

Speaker: Masatomo Torikai (Ph.D. Student, Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, University of Tokyo, Japan)

Department of Political Science and International Affairs 

Research Seminar

The cost of the strong power vertical: Strong vertical control of cadre rotations and its consequences in local electoral mobilization

November 27, 2020 | 16.00. 

ZOOM

The Russian Presidential Administration prefers to deploy outsider governors in recent years. Deploying relatively loyal outsider governors is a natural choice for the federal government to strengthen the power vertical.

However, what is the regional consequence of such cadre policies? At first, outsider governors tend to hurry to cancellations of the direct popular elections of municipal executive chiefs to effectively organize their teams in the regions with which they have only scarce ties. Using the original datasets of the governor profiles and cancellations of the popular direct elections in relatively large cities in Russia, the survival analysis provides empirical evidence that cancellations of the direct popular elections of municipal executive chiefs are more likely to happen under outsider governors. Secondly, the electoral performance tends to be lower under outsider governors than under local governors. This study posits that the reason behind the poorer electoral performance of outsider governors is the unsound relationship with local municipal elites. Exploiting the original datasets of the municipal executive chiefs, the study empirically demonstrates that the appointed municipal executive chiefs more effectively deliver votes only under local governors, but not under outsider governors. In conclusion, although outsider governors seek to enhance their influence on cadre rotations in the regions by canceling the popular elections of municipal executive chiefs, they are likely to be poor mobilizers in elections due to discord with local elites. In this sense, the deployment of outsider governors has its own pros and cons from the perspective of the Presidential Administration.

 

Working languages are English / Russian. 

 

Seminar will be online via Zoom. 

The link to join Zoom: https://zoom.us/j/94478694966?pwd=b1E5cTZXOUtRQnpobWdtaXgxd29sUT09

Meeting ID: 944 7869 4966

Password:   664958

If you have questions please contact Stanislav Shkel (sshkel@hse.ru ).