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The chapter overviews the development of the EU-Russia cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Taking as a starting point the agreement to create the four common spaces in 2003, including the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, the paper traces how the incorporation of the visa-free regime prospects into the Road Map for the Common Space has had a lasting impact on all further collaborative attempts before the freeze of cooperation in early 2014. Being an instance of policy conditionality which the EU often applies to the countries whose membership prospects are off the table, visa waiver prospects has restructured relations between the EU and Russia from being equitable (as initially presupposed by the common spaces) to strictly hierarchical. Moreover, with time passing by the EU was able to use this instrument not only in relation to the areas of cooperation directly linked to visa arrangements but also to the issues of security and justice which had been initially left to the network governance approach in the Road Map – a subtler and less hierarchical mode of the EU external governance. This creeping approach reached its climax in late 2013 when the Commission stopped hiding its resolve to use policy conditionality and coupled it with the value-loaded rhetoric of classical political conditionality, effectively bringing the cooperation on the verge of a stalemate. Paradoxically, the major breakthroughs in EU-Russia cooperation in JHA owe exactly to this policy conditionality whereas the network governance mode has borne almost no fruit to this day.
This article examines intra-regional (‘home-grown’) and externally-driven (‘imported’) frameworks of regional migration
governance in post-Soviet Eurasia. It argues that whether regional migration governance originates from internal or external sources makes an important difference. It shows that intra-regional migration governance develops around economic rationality, whereas externally-driven regional migration governance tends to prioritise linkages between migration and security and, albeit less systematically, issues of migrants’ rights. The article demonstrates how intra-regional migration governance started to emerge as part of regional integration processes, becoming institutionalised within organisations such as the Eurasian Economic Union. It also shows how alternative versions of regional migration governance have been promoted by international organisations via, in particular, Regional Consultative Processes. It concludes with a reflection on competition and complementarity between these partially overlapping regimes of regional migration governance in Eurasia.
Книга посвящена рассмотрению угроз академическим свободам по всему миру и различным способам противостоять этим угрозам
Эта книга посвящена рассмотрению угроз академическим свободам в мире и способам им противостоять
The main features of the post-Soviet policy Russia was pursuing in the Middle East at the turn of the century were the following: rejecting messianic ideas, great-Powerness and confrontation. Russia became more pragmatic; its policy stopped being “pro”, such as “pro-Arab” or “pro-Israeli”. Basically, Russia tried to follow its own interest, placing the emphasis, first of all, on mutually beneficial collaboration. Competition with the West for dominance in the region did not play the defining role for Moscow any more.
Russia preferred to stay away from Washington’s affairs, although “pointed out unnecessary mistakes of its regional policy in quite a discreet way, not willing to confront, but, on the contrary, looking for possible ways to collaborate”. The 2003 events in Iraq can be called the primary example of this, since Russia did not try to prevent the US-led military operation against Saddam Hussain’s regime. A certain part of the Russian political elite was calling for “protecting the amicable Iraq regime”, but was retorted by Vladimir Lukin, the head of the International Affairs Committee: “Again we dreamt of being crowned as the world’s finest peacemakers… and that resulted in damaging relations with the USA administration which deserved much more care and respect”