Advanced Microeconomics I

2026/2027

Academic Year

ENG

Instruction in English

3

ECTS credits

Delivered at:

Department of Economics

Course type:

Compulsory course

When:

1 year, 1 module

Instructor

Kuchumova (Paramonova), Yulia A.

Course Syllabus

Abstract

This course will provide the students with knowledge and understanding on how to model the behavior of agents in situations, where they have reason to act strategically. That is, the students will learn game theory, which is the systematic study of how rational agents behave in strategic situations, or in games, where each agent must first know the decision of the other agents before knowing which decision is best for himself. The study of this discipline is based on the following disciplines: "Optimization", "Microeconomics-1", "Microeconomics-2", "Game Theory", "Probability Theory". The main provisions of the discipline should be used in future when studying the following disciplines: "Corporate Finance", "Theory of Finance-2", "Financial Markets", "Corporate Governance", "Theory of Industry Markets", "Public Sector Economics", "Labor Economics".

Learning Objectives

• • To get familiar with games in which the agents make a single, simultaneous choice (Strategic-form Games) and with games in which players may make choices in sequence (Extensive-form games). • To learn a variety of methods for determining the outcome of a game, which gives rise to a particular solution concept such as dominant strategy equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, • To learn such equilibrium concepts for extensive-form games as backward induction, subgame perfection, and sequential equilibrium.
• • To get familiar with games in which the agents make a single, simultaneous choice (Strategic-form Games) and with games in which players may make choices in sequence (Extensive-form games). • To learn a variety of methods for determining the outcome of a game, which gives rise to a particular solution concept such as dominant strategy equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, • To learn such equilibrium concepts for extensive-form games as backward induction, subgame perfection, and sequential equilibrium.

Expected Learning Outcomes

• Able to solve professional problems based on synthesis and analysis
• Gain knowledge and skills in order to make management decisions in this area
• Distinguish between qualitative and quantitative research methods;

Course Contents

• 1. Foundations & Static Games of Complete Information
• 2. Games of Incomplete Information (Bayesian Games)
• 3. Dynamic Games & Perfect Information
• 4. Imperfect Information & Refinements

Assessment Elements

• In-class participation
• Homework assignments (HA)
• Test
• Final exam

Interim Assessment

• 2026/2027 1st module
  0.2 * Test + 0.05 * In-class participation + 0.5 * Final exam + 0.25 * Homework assignments (HA)

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

• Advanced microeconomic theory, Jehle, G. A., 2011

Recommended Additional Bibliography

• Advanced microeconomic theory, Jehle, G., 2000

Authors

• Brodskaia Natalia Nikolaevna
• Kuchumova Iuliia Andreevna