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Corporate Governance

2020/2021
Учебный год
ENG
Обучение ведется на английском языке
4
Кредиты
Статус:
Курс по выбору
Когда читается:
1-й курс, 3 модуль

Course Syllabus

Abstract

Elective course “Corporate governance” is intended for Master students following the programs “Finance” and “Applied Economics and Mathematical Methods”. In addition, the course draws the students’ attention to modern methods of empirical analysis in the field of corporate governance, finance and economics. The main topics covered include: Defining corporate governance and key theoretical models; Mechanisms to incentivise and discipline badly performing managers; Corporate governance and stakeholders; National models of corporate governance; Corporate governance in Russia.
Learning Objectives

Learning Objectives

  • give the students a firm grasp of corporate governance as an academic field, with emphasis on the agency (or finance) perspective (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, JF 1997) as opposed to alternative theories (stakeholder, stewardship, resource-dependence theories, etc.).
Expected Learning Outcomes

Expected Learning Outcomes

  • Understand corporate governance as a rapidly developing field of research at the intersection of economics, finance and management
  • Know the key theoretical concepts and main empirical results within the finance perspective on corporate governance
  • Be able to take reasonable and responsible financial decisions aimed at addressing agency problems in firms
  • Be able to recognize and take into consideration interests of various stakeholders when assessing corporate governance at the firm level
  • Be familiar with modern methods of empirical research in the field of corporate governance
  • Be able to critically evaluate current research in this field
Course Contents

Course Contents

  • Introduction to corporate governance
    Lecture 1. Introduction to corporate governance (4 hours) Evolution of the firm and corporations. Individual self-interest. The principal-agent model and agency costs. The classic agency problem vs. expropriation of minority shareholders. Defining corporate governance: alternative approaches.
  • Mechanisms of corporate governance
    Lecture 2. Mechanisms of corporate governance (4 hours) Overview of the key mechanisms of corporate governance, including product market competition, the market for corporate control, boards of directors, large shareholder monitoring, managerial ownership and compensation.
  • National models of corporate governance
    Lecture 3. National models of corporate governance (4 hours) Ownership and control across the globe. Dispersed ownership and concentrated control. Taxonomies of corporate governance systems. Corporate governance in selected economies.
  • Corporate governance and stakeholders
    Lecture 4. Corporate governance and stakeholders (4 hours) The role of debtholders in corporate governance. Employee rights and voice across corporate governance systems. Corporate social responsibility and socially responsible investment.
  • Corporate governance in Russia
    Lecture 5. Corporate governance in Russia (4 hours) Privatization and ownership dynamics. The legal environment. Corporate governance conflicts and mechanisms. Future prospects.
Assessment Elements

Assessment Elements

  • non-blocking seminar
  • non-blocking written test
  • non-blocking participation mark
  • non-blocking exam
Interim Assessment

Interim Assessment

  • Interim assessment (3 module)
    0.4 * exam + 0.15 * participation mark + 0.25 * seminar + 0.2 * written test
Bibliography

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

  • Becht, M., Bolton, P., & Roell, A. (2003). Corporate governance and control. Handbook of the Economics of Finance, 1. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.h.eee.finchp.1.01
  • Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A Survey of Corporate Governance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x

Recommended Additional Bibliography

  • Ichiro Iwasaki. (2007). Enterprise Reform And Corporate Governance In Russia: A Quantitative Survey. Journal of Economic Surveys, (5), 849. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.bla.jecsur.v21y2007i5p849.902
  • Michael C. Jensen, & William H. Meckling. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.608A4D5A
  • Olga Lazareva, Andrei Rachinsky, & Sergey Stepanov. (2007). A Survey of Corporate Governance in Russia. Working Papers. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.p.abo.neswpt.w0103