Яновский Егор Александрович
- Know types of games and solution concepts
- Understand the main concepts and properties of mechanism design
- Know standard auction forms and able to find optimal bidding functions
- Know Revenue Equivalence Theorem, its assumptions and applications
- Able to define and apply fair division, assignment, matching and voting mechanisms
- know properties of these mechanisms
- Able to identify deficiencies in real-life markets
- Introduction to voting. Basic voting rules and their properties.
- Independence of irrelevant alternatives and its relaxations. Arrow's impossibility theorem.
- VCG--mechanisms. Auctions.
- Matching and assignment mechanisms: dictatorships, core, serial, deferred, and immediate acceptance.
- Introduction to Computational social choice.
- Bargaining. Claims problem.
- Interim assessment (1 module)0.6 * exam + 0.1 * test 1 + 0.1 * test 2 + 0.1 * test 3 + 0.1 * test 4
- Handbook of Computational Social Choice. (2016). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107446984
- Maurice Salles. (2017). Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jerôme Lang, and Ariel Procaccia (eds), Handbook of Computational Social Choice. Œconomia, (4), 609. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsdoj&AN=edsdoj.36f5aed642d4bd999af031217bc8811
- Paul Klemperer. (2004). Auctions: Theory and Practice. SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.b.oet.tbooks.auction1