Теория контрактов и асимметричная информация

2020/2021

Учебный год

RUS

Обучение ведется на русском языке

3

Кредиты

Кто читает:

Департамент экономики

Статус:

Курс по выбору

Когда читается:

3-й курс, 1 модуль

Преподаватели

Коковин Сергей Гелиевич

Коновалов Александр Викторович

Телятников Николай Сергеевич

Программа дисциплины

Аннотация

This course provides an overview of the classical as well as advanced topics in contract theory. We are going to start with the classical principal-agent models of screening and moral hazard and learn how managers create incentives for their employees. These models involve two parties: a principal (e.g. manager) and an agent (e.g. employee). The principal delegates a task to the agent by offering him a contact. In the moral hazard problem, the agent's actions are hidden (noncontractible), yet they affect an outcome that can be included in a contract. In the screening problem, the agent has some private information relevant to the task. In both problems, asymmetric information creates inefficiency. In the second part of the course we consider various extensions of these two problems to many agents and dynamic environment. At the end of the course we'll shift gears to a different area of market design and learn how to get married (matching theory).

Цель освоения дисциплины

• Understand consequences for the character and efficiency of the interaction between individuals and organizations, when one party has more or better information on some aspect of relationship
• Know how to evaluate the value of information
• Know the basics of the theory of contracts and the trade-off between stimulation and warranty
• Understand the consequences of endogenous information acquisition

Планируемые результаты обучения

• Know how to evaluate the value of information
• Know the ways to measure uncertainty
• Understand efficiency/inefficiency of the interaction between individuals and organizations, when one party has more or better information on some aspect of relationship
• Understand the consequences of endogenous information acquisition

Содержание учебной дисциплины

• Adverse Selection: Akerloff model
• Principal-Agent Problem with complete information: stimulation schemes
• Principal-Agent Problem with Hidden Type, i.e., Screening: (Menu of Contracts, Price Discrimination)
• Principal-Agent Problem with Hidden Actions (Moral Hazard)

Элементы контроля

• Class test 1
• Class test 2
• Class test 3
• Class test 4

Промежуточная аттестация

• Промежуточная аттестация (1 модуль)
  0.25 * Class test 1 + 0.25 * Class test 2 + 0.25 * Class test 3 + 0.25 * Class test 4

Список литературы

Рекомендуемая основная литература

• Merkl, C. (2012). Veldkamp, L.: Information Choice in Macroeconomics and Finance. Journal of Economics, 107(1), 97–99. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-012-0282-8

Рекомендуемая дополнительная литература

• Krishna, V. (2010). Auction Theory (Vol. 2nd ed). Burlington, MA: Academic Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsebk&AN=297062