• A
  • A
  • A
  • АБВ
  • АБВ
  • АБВ
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
Обычная версия сайта
07
Апрель

Information Economics

2018/2019
Учебный год
ENG
Обучение ведется на английском языке
3
Кредиты
Статус:
Курс по выбору
Когда читается:
3-й курс, 1 модуль

Course Syllabus

Abstract

We will study models featuring informational asymmetries, and their consequences on both micro and macroeconomic behavior. On the theoretical level, the course will introduce students to the modeling framework ofadverse selection, signaling, screening, principal-agent problem, auction theory, global games and rational inattention. On the level of applications, we will look closer into insurance market, pricing, financial bubbles,issues of central banking and labor market.
Learning Objectives

Learning Objectives

  • study of the role of information in economic modeling
Expected Learning Outcomes

Expected Learning Outcomes

  • Understand consequences for the character and efficiency of the interaction between individuals and organizations, when one party has more or better information on some aspect of relationship.
  • Know standard formats of the auctions
  • Know how to evaluate the value of information.
  • Know the ways to measure uncertainty
  • Understand the consequences of endogenous information acquisition
Course Contents

Course Contents

  • Information asymmetries
    - Adverse Selection - Signaling - Screening Utility Maximization and Choice
  • Principal-Agent Problem
    - Hidden Actions (Moral Hazard) - Hidden Information(Menu of Contracts)
  • Private Value Auctions
  • Global Games
  • Endogenous Information Acquisition (mostly Rational Inattention)
Assessment Elements

Assessment Elements

  • non-blocking activity in the class
  • non-blocking in-class test
  • non-blocking final exam
Interim Assessment

Interim Assessment

  • Interim assessment (1 module)
    0.1 * activity in the class + 0.6 * final exam + 0.3 * in-class test
Bibliography

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

  • Krishna, V. (2010). Auction Theory (Vol. 2nd ed). Burlington, MA: Academic Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsebk&AN=297062

Recommended Additional Bibliography

  • Christian Merkl. (2012). Veldkamp, L.: Information Choice in Macroeconomics and Finance. Journal of Economics, (1), 97. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-012-0282-8