International Conference "Economic Design and Algorithms in St Petersburg", July 8-9, 2019

Ph: Anastasia Goryavina

Photos on Google Drive

On July, 8-9, the International Laboratory of Game Theory and Decision Making held the International Conference Economic Design and Algorithms in St. Petersburg.

OVERVIEW
The conference brought together 20 economists and computer scientists. It focused on design problems where the methodologies of these two communities interact successfully, including but not limited to:
●    Market design
●    Matching and assignment
●    Voting rules
●    Fair division
●    Information design
●    Auctions
●    Networks

ORGANIZING COMMITTEE
Anna Bogomolnaia (HSE, University of Glasgow)
Herve Moulin (HSE, University of Glasgow)
Alexander Nesterov (HSE)
Fedor Sandomirskiy (HSE, Technion)
Constantine Sorokin (HSE, University of Glasgow)

CONFERENCE PROGRAM

Conference Program (PDF, 98 Kb)

Our speakers:
Francis Bloch (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne): Pricing in anonymized networks

Expand all

Philip Grech (ETH Zurich): A posteriori power indices: organizing theory, a new index, and Brexit

Moshe Babaioff (Microsoft Research): Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets

Arunava Sen (Indian Statistical Institute): When is checking a subset of incentive-compatibility constraints sufficient for strategy-proofness? A Characterization and Applications

Fabrizio Germano (Universitat Pompeu Fabra): The few-get-richer: a surprising consequence of popularity-based rankings

Eyal Winter (Hebrew University of Jerusalem): Raising Capital from Heterogeneous Investors

Olga Gorelkina (University of Liverpool Management School): Collusion via Information Sharing and Optimal Auctions

Hadi Hosseini (Rochester Institute of Technology): Fair Division through Information Withholding

Jay Sethuraman (Columbia University): Dynamic Matching in School Choice: Efficient Seat Reassignment after Late Cancellations

Wolfgang Leininger (TU Dortmund University): Evolutionary Equilibrium in Contests with Stochastic Participation: Entry, Effort, and Overdissipation

Umut Dur (North Carolina State University): Family Ties: School Assignment With Siblings

Rida Laraki (University of Paris Dauphine): Stable Matching with Efforts

Peter Biro (Hungarian Academy of Sciences): Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare

Debasis Mishra (Indian Statistical Institute): Stable dissolution of a partnership

Haris Aziz (The University of New South Wales): Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Chores

Rodrigo Velez (Texas A&M University): Expressive mechanisms for equitable rent division on a budget

Antonio Nicolo (University of Padua): Stable Sharing

Nick Gravin (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics): Envy-freeness up to any item with high Nash welfare

Yu Zhou (Waseda University): Competitive Equilibria in Matching Models with Financial Constraints

Katharina Huesmann (University of Cologne): Public Assignment of Scarce Resources under Income Effects

The conference was preceded by a 2-days Summer School Game Theory: Applications, Networks, Emotions (July 5-6, 2019)
SUMMER SCHOOL WEBPAGE

VENUE
3A Kantemirovskaya st, St Petersburg, Russia

CONFERENCE MANAGER
Xenia Adaeva xeniya.adayeva@gmail.com

Have you spotted a typo?
Highlight it, click Ctrl+Enter and send us a message. Thank you for your help!
To be used only for spelling or punctuation mistakes.