Guest Research Seminar on June, 5th: Anastas Tenev

International Laboratory of Game Theory and Decision Making invites you to take part in the research seminar by Anastas Tenev (Maastricht University, The Netherlands)

Language of instruction: English
Time: June 5th, 2018 (Tuesday) from 15.00 till 16.30
Place: 3A Kantemirovskaya st., room 358

Guest Speaker: Anastas Tenev

Topic: Naïve Imitation and Partial Cooperation in a Local Public Good Model

Abstract: This paper analyses a local interaction model in which agents play bilateral prisoners’ dilemmas with their immediate neighbours on a circle. The agents can use one of three possible strategies: they can be altruists (A) who cooperate in all interactions, egoists (E) who defect in all interactions, or employ a partial strategy (P) which allows the agents to act differently with each of their neighbours, i.e. be altruistic to one of them and egoistic to the other. P acts altruistically towards either the left-hand or the right-hand neighbour with probability 1/2 each. Agents apply a naïve imitation decision rule – after the first period they use the strategy which has the highest average payoff from the ones they have observed in their local neighbourhood.
The absorbing states of the process are outlined and analysed. Coexistence of the partial strategy and the other two strategies does not happen in the absorbing states of the system. Moreover, the introduction of the partial strategy impedes the progress of altruism by limiting the probability of its diffusion in the population. Even though clustering together of the altruists is generally beneficial for sustaining altruism, relatively big groups of altruists at the onset actually favour the spread of the partial strategy, while relatively scattered altruists in the initial state benefit the propagation of egoists.

Everyone interested is invited!

No registration.
If you have any questions please contact Xenia Adaeva via xadaeva@hse.ru