Доцент департамента экономики Арсений Самсонов выступил с докладом на реглуряном научном семинаре

Темой научно-исследовательского семинара стала "Cheap talk with burned money and state-independent sender preferences". 

Абстракт: I characterize Pareto-optimal equilibria in a cheap-talk game with burned money and state-independent sender preferences. An equilibrium is Pareto-optimal if and only if there exists a threshold such that the Sender reveals all states below it by burning money and pools all states above it by burning no money in any of them. In particular, the unique equilibrium that is both Pareto-optimal and Receiver-optimal is one where the Sender reveals all states by burning money. The unique equilibrium that is both Pareto-optimal and Sender-optimal is one where the Sender pools all states by burning no money in any of them.