Прошёл ещё один регулярный научный семинар департамента экономики: Do Not Look Back: The Consequences of Hesitation

17 декабря 2025 состоялся очередной научно-исследовательский семинар департамента экономики.

Тема доклада: Do Not Look Back: The Consequences of Hesitation

Докладчик: Кирилл Афанасьев, преподаватель и аспирант департамента экономики, стажёр-исследователь Международной лаборатории теории игр и принятия решений

Абстракт: Sometimes individuals hesitate to engage in, or to conceal, behaviors that they expect will be sanctioned by second- or third-parties. Yet when a norm is weak or ambiguous, acting confidently and transparently may paradoxically be more advantageous, as confidence and openness can themselves signal that the behavior is appropriate. This tension between concealment and confident disclosure raises questions about how observers form empirical and normative expectations when information about others’ actions is uncertain or selectively hidden. In this research proposal, I outline two laboratory experiments designed to investigate how concealment, transparency, and decision confidence shape third-party punishment, the updating of social norms, and individuals’ subsequent behavioral adjustments. Together, these experiments aim to clarify when hiding a potentially inappropriate action exacerbates negative judgments, when transparency mitigates them, and how these mechanisms contribute to the emergence, distortion, or stabilization of social norms.