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Mathematical methods in economics: game theory and mechanism design

2022/2023
Учебный год
ENG
Обучение ведется на английском языке
3
Кредиты
Статус:
Курс по выбору
Когда читается:
2-й курс, 2 модуль

Course Syllabus

Abstract

Game theory is a Mechanism design is a science of how to construct economic mechanisms (rules, environments, institutions) with desirable properties. While the usual microeconomic approach aims at understanding how agents behave in certain environments given certain rules, Mechanism design aims at finding "good" rules, that lead to desirable outcomes. At the same time the rules themselves have to be simple and non-manipulable, i.e., provide incentives to participate sincerely.
Learning Objectives

Learning Objectives

  • Mechanism design uses game theory tools and can be considered as its most applied part. The range of applications is very broad: from auctions and internet marketplaces to admission of young students to colleges, voting mechanisms, online dating services, and many others. The course will provide an overview of general methods used to design mechanisms in different areas of life.
Expected Learning Outcomes

Expected Learning Outcomes

  • Able to identify deficiencies in real-life markets
  • Know types of games and solution concepts
  • Understand the main concepts and properties of mechanism design: strategy-proofness, types of fairness, efficiency
  • Know design problems and mechanisms: voting, fair division, assignment, matching, auctions, claims
Course Contents

Course Contents

  • Introduction, refresher on game theory, inventory of design problems
  • Incentives
  • Efficiency
  • Fairness
Assessment Elements

Assessment Elements

  • non-blocking Activity
  • non-blocking Homework
  • non-blocking Final exam
    The final exam will take 2 hours
Interim Assessment

Interim Assessment

  • 2022/2023 2nd module
    0.1 * Activity + 0.6 * Final exam + 0.3 * Homework
Bibliography

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

  • Paul Klemperer. (2004). Auctions: Theory and Practice. SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.b.oet.tbooks.auction1
  • Roth, A. E., & Sotomayor, M. A. O. (1992). Two-Sided Matching. Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.b.cup.cbooks.9780521437882

Recommended Additional Bibliography

  • Handbook of Computational Social Choice. (2016). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107446984