We Don't Serve "Free-Riders": An Analysis of the Process of Ensuring Compliance with EAEU Environmental Standarts in Russia

Can Environmental Norms Work Without Sanctions? A new study shows how the EAEU promotes compliance with environmental norms despite lacking formal enforcement powers.

The problem of collective action is a central challenge for compliance with international environmental law. International organisations often face a free-rider dilemma: states seek to benefit from collective environmental goodswhile avoiding the costs of producing them. Global environmental regimes typically lack effective enforcement mechanisms - each country determines its own contribution, and compliance monitoring is based on voluntary reporting. However, regional integration projects, even when relying on "soft law", can achieve surprisingly high levels of compliance through institutional design and economic incentives. In our study, we examine how the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) - a regional organisation without hard enforcement powers - ensures compliance with environmental norms in Russia. Unlike the European Union with its infringement procedure, the EAEU relies on a unique mechanism: environmental regulations are "packaged" into technical regulations that have direct effect across member states. The key incentive for compliance is the risk of losing access to the common market's benefits.

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To understand how abstract international norms are transformed into national policy instruments, the study employs the NATO framework. NATO classifies policy tools into four types: Nodality (information-based measures), Authority (commands, prohibitions, permissions), Treasure (financial incentives, subsidies, taxes), and Organization (institutional capacity building). Russia adapts EAEU technical regulations through national standards (GOSTs), certification systems, and other legal acts. These can belong to any of the four categories, and their mix reflects the country's governance context.

The study's empirical aim is to determine whether key integration events in the EAEU changed the quantitative and structural characteristics of Russian environmental legal acts. The main method is interrupted time series (ITS) with segmented regression - a quasi-experimental design that estimates both immediate level changes and trend shifts after an intervention. The dataset covers January 2010 to December 2025 (192 months) and includes 43 EAEU technical regulations containing environmental provisions, and 127 Russian normative legal acts (REGULATIONs) that directly or indirectly refer to EAEU regulations. The Russian REGULATIONs are classified into eight sectors: forestry, water, waste, protected areas, general environment, subsoil, fisheries, and agriculture. Four intervention dates are coded: 2015 (start of EAEU functioning), 2016 (adoption of "green economy" concept), 2018 (first specialised environmental technical regulations), and 2023 (major update of technical regulations). Seasonal controls for June, November, and December account for the Russian parliamentary and government cycle. The model uses Newey-West standard errors to correct for autocorrelation.

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Descriptive statistics show that from 2010 to 2025, Russia adopted 127 environmental REGULATIONs. Authority instruments dominate - 119 acts (82%) consisting of federal prohibitions and permissions. Treasure (13 acts) and Organization (16 acts) increased noticeably after 2018. Nodality remained marginal (9 acts). The ITS results for total REGULATIONs reveal that the 2015 event (start of EAEU) had no statistically significant immediate effect (β = -0.0052, p = 0.424) and no trend change. The 2016 green economy concept produced a significant immediate jump (β = 0.0174, p = 0.005). The 2018 event (first environmental technical regulations) did not cause an immediate level shift (β = 0.0108, p = 0.068) but led to a significant positive trend increase (β = 0.0004, p = 0.046). The 2023 mass update of technical regulations generated the strongest immediate jump (β = 0.0315, p < 0.001). However, after 2023 the trend turned negative (β = -0.0005, p = 0.013), possibly reflecting an overload of supranational environmental regulations that Russia must harmonise with its legislation. Seasonal dummies show significant peaks in November (β = 0.0124, p = 0.018) and December (β = 0.0321, p < 0.001), confirming end-year legislative activity.

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When the model is run separately for each NATO instrument (aggregated quarterly due to sparse data), authority replicates the overall pattern: a significant jump in 2016 (β = 0.1034, p = 0.015), trend increase after 2018 (β = 0.0025, p = 0.027), strong jump in 2023 (β = 0.1856, p < 0.001), and negative post-2023 trend (β = -0.0029, p = 0.012). Treasure instruments were almost absent before 2023 but showed a strong immediate jump in 2023 (β = 0.0621, p < 0.001) followed by a negative trend (β = -0.001, p = 0.012). This reflects the adoption of decrees on environmental damage fees and the ecological collection. Organization instruments (institutional acts) also increased significantly in 2023 (β = 0.0448, p = 0.015), with a seasonal effect in Q4 (β = 0.0221, p = 0.032) - examples include the national registry of integrated environmental permits and statutes of nature reserves. Nodality instruments showed only a 2023 jump (β = 0.0157, p = 0.032) and then a marginally negative trend.

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Sector-specific ITS results (quarterly) show that the strongest effects occurred in waste management, forestry, and water resources. Waste management REGULATIONs had a significant immediate jump in 2016 (β = 0.0182, p = 0.032), a positive trend after 2016 (β = 0.0009, p = 0.038), a strong jump in 2023 (β = 0.0456, p < 0.001), and a negative trend after 2023 (β = -0.0011, p = 0.023). Forestry REGULATIONs jumped in 2016 (β = 0.0214, p = 0.048), showed trend acceleration after 2018 (β = 0.0012, p = 0.021), a strong 2023 jump (β = 0.0321, p = 0.002), and a Q4 seasonal effect (β = 0.0181, p = 0.044). Water resources REGULATIONs had a positive trend after 2018 (β = 0.0008, p = 0.045) and a 2023 jump (β = 0.0287, p = 0.005). General environmental REGULATIONs showed a 2023 jump (β = 0.0987, p < 0.001) and then a negative trend (β = -0.0023, p = 0.008). Subsoil REGULATIONs had a modest 2023 jump (β = 0.0142, p = 0.045).

The EAEU case demonstrates that even without formal sanctions, states' desire to secure market access for their producers, combined with reputational concerns, can drive systematic national implementation. Russia does not merely formally transpose technical regulations. It converts the supranational environmental framework into concrete policy instruments at the national level. The dominance of authority tools reflects Russia's preference for command-and-control mechanisms, but the growing share of treasure and organization after 2018 indicates increasing attention to economic incentives and institutional capacity. The negative trend after 2023 suggests that the portfolio of EAEU environmental regulations may have reached a saturation point, requiring a period of digestion and consolidation. Future research should compare Russia's experience with other EAEU members and explore why some sectors (waste, forestry, water) are more sensitive to supranational integration than others.


Author: A. Sorbale
Source: arpafoundation.org