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Regular version of the site

Economic Mechanism Design

2022/2023
Academic Year
ENG
Instruction in English
4
ECTS credits
Course type:
Elective course
When:
4 year, 1 module

Instructor

Course Syllabus

Abstract

Mechanism design is a science of how to construct economic mechanisms (rules, environments, institutions) with desirable properties. While the usual microeconomic approach aims at understanding how agents behave in certain environments given certain rules, Mechanism design aims at finding "good" rules that lead to desirable outcomes. At the same time the rules themselves have to be simple and non-manipulable, i.e. provide incentives to participate sincerely. Mechanism design uses game theory tools and can be considered as its most applied part. The range of applications is very broad: from auctions and internet marketplaces to admission of young students to colleges, voting mechanisms, online dating services, and many others.
Learning Objectives

Learning Objectives

  • provide an overview of general methods used to design mechanisms in different areas of life
  • provide an overview of general methods used to design mechanisms in different areas of life
  • overview of general methods used to design mechanisms in different areas of life
Expected Learning Outcomes

Expected Learning Outcomes

  • Able to define and apply fair division, assignment, matching and voting mechanisms
  • Able to identify deficiencies in real-life markets
  • know properties of these mechanisms
  • Know Revenue Equivalence Theorem, its assumptions and applications
  • Know standard auction forms and able to find optimal bidding functions
  • Know types of games and solution concepts
  • Understand the main concepts and properties of mechanism design
Course Contents

Course Contents

  • Introduction to voting
  • Independence of irrelevant alternatives and its relaxations.
  • VCG - mechanisms
  • Matching and assignment mechanisms
  • Introduction to Computational social choice.
  • Bargaining
Assessment Elements

Assessment Elements

  • non-blocking Test 1
  • non-blocking Exam
  • non-blocking Test 2
  • non-blocking Test 3
  • non-blocking Test 4
Interim Assessment

Interim Assessment

  • 2022/2023 1st module
    0.1 * Test 1 + 0.1 * Test 2 + 0.1 * Test 4 + 0.6 * Exam + 0.1 * Test 3
Bibliography

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

  • Handbook of Computational Social Choice. (2016). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107446984

Recommended Additional Bibliography

  • Maurice Salles. (2017). Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jerôme Lang, and Ariel Procaccia (eds), Handbook of Computational Social Choice. Œconomia, (4), 609. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsdoj&AN=edsdoj.36f5aed642d4bd999af031217bc8811
  • Paul Klemperer. (2004). Auctions: Theory and Practice. SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.b.oet.tbooks.auction1