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Research seminar: János Flesch (Maastricht, the Netherlands)

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International Laboratory of Game Theory and Decision Making invites you to take part in the research seminar by János Flesch (Associate Professor of the Department of Quantitative Economics, School of Business and Economics, Maastricht University, The Netherlands)

Language of instruction: English
Time: May 11th, 2018 (Friday) from 14.00 till 15.20
Place: 3A Kantemirovskaya st., room 343

Guest Speaker: János Flesch

Topic: Approximate subgame-perfect equilibria in perfect information games

Abstract: We consider games with perfect information and deterministic transitions. Such games can be seen as a directed tree. In this tree, each node is associated with a player, who controls this node. We assume that each node has at least one successor, rather than having terminal nodes.Play of the game starts at the root. At any node that play visits, the player who controls this node has to choose one of the outgoing arcs, which brings play to a next node. This induces an infinite path in the tree from the root. Depending on this path, each player receives a payoff. Note that these payoffs are fairly general, and thus this setup encompasses the cases of discounted payoffs or long-term average payoffs, as well as the usual payoff functions considered in the literature of computer science (reachability objectives,etc.).

These games do not always have a subgame perfect equilibrium. In this talk we address the question when such a game admits a subgame perfect epsilon-equilibrium, for every positive error-term epsilon. We present two existence results: one with pure strategies and one with randomized strategies.

Everyone interested is invited!

No registration.
If you have any questions please contact Xenia Adaeva via xadaeva@hse.ru